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I. Introduction
2014 was undoubtedly a busy year for immigration law and policy. Both the United
States and Europe saw surges in the number of intending immigrations attempting to
enter, fleeing violence, poverty, and other factors making life in their home countries
difficult. The United States has struggled to find a unified approach to respond to the
influx of migrants, largely from Central America. Accordingly, President Obama re-
sponded with Executive Action, which likely will be challenged in the courts in the up-
coming year. Jihan Hassan considers the surge and the executive response in her
contribution to this edition of the Year in Review.
While the United States addresses its unlawful migrant dilemma, other countries have
been looking for ways to attract more lawful migrants. Marina Bugallal Garrido and Me-
lanie Glover dig into new attempts by the Spanish Government to attract foreign entre-
preneurs to help reinvigorate their struggling economy. And Sergio Karas leads off this
issue with an exploration of the work permit process for specialized knowledge workers in
Canada. The Committee's contribution to this edition of the Year in Review reflects the
need to continually modify immigration law to address its constantly changing patterns
and practice around the world.
A. MAJOR CHANGES FOR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE WORKERS IN CANADA***
On June 9, 2014, the Federal Government published Operational Bulletin (OB) 575,
which expands guidelines for immigration officers assessing Work Permit applications for
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Intra-Company Transferees with Specialized Knowledge. The OB provides direction to
the officers as to how to evaluate the criteria under which those workers are granted Work
Permits. The OB also makes it more difficult to use this exemption from the Labour
Market Opinion (LMO) process as it now requires a higher threshold of advanced propri-
etary knowledge to qualify.'
Intra-Company Transferees admitted under the Specialized Knowledge category are
LMO exempt. Following the federal government scrutiny of the Temporary Foreign
Worker Program, applicants and their counsel have increasingly looked at ways to bring
to Canada temporary foreign workers avoiding the cumbersome LMO process. One of
the ways this often is done is by using the Intra-Company Transferee category, which
allows the transfer of Senior Managerial and Executive personnel as well as Specialized
Knowledge workers who comply with the prescribed criteria and are performing services
for an employer in Canada that is a related entity to their employer abroad. Effective
immediately, immigration officers are directed to use the new criteria to determine if the
applicant possesses a high standard of specialized knowledge and is receiving wages consis-
tent with the Canadian prevailing wage for that occupation.2
To have "Specialized Knowledge" and to meet the requirements of the new policy, an
Intra-Company Transferee Specialized Knowledge applicant would be required to
demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, a high degree of both proprietary knowledge
and advanced expertise. Proprietary knowledge alone, or advanced expertise alone, does
not qualify the applicant under this exemption. The onus is on the applicant to provide
evidence that he or she meets this standard. Documentary evidence to substantiate this
expanded level of knowledge may include the following: a resume, reference letters, letter
of support from the employer, job descriptions outlining the level of training acquired,
years of experience in the field, degrees or certifications obtained that are related to the
field of work, list of publications and awards received by the applicant, and a detailed
description of the work to be performed in Canada.'
The new definition articulates the elements of "Specialized Knowledge" as the
following:
"Proprietary Knowledge" is company-specific expertise related to a company's product
or services. It implies the company has not divulged specifications that would allow other
companies to duplicate the product or service.
"Advanced proprietary knowledge" would require an applicant to demonstrate uncom-
mon knowledge of the firm's products or services and its application in international mar-
kets, or an advanced level of expertise or knowledge of the enterprise's processes and
procedures such as its production, research, equipment, techniques, or management.
"Advanced level of expertise" is also necessary, which would require specialized knowl-
edge gained through significant and recent experience with the organization and used by
the individual to contribute significantly to the employer's productivity. "Significant" is
not defined and is not always a meaningful indicator, but it relates to the length of experi-
ence possessed by the foreign worker. "Recent" is defined as experience obtained within
the last five years.
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In assessing the "Advanced level of expertise," officers must consider the following:
1. abilities that are unusual and different from those generally found in a particular
industry and that cannot be easily transferred to another individual in the short-
term;
2. the knowledge or expertise must be highly unusual both within the industry and
within the host firm;
3. it must be of a nature such that the applicant's proprietary knowledge is critical to
the business of the Canadian branch and a significant disruption of business would
occur without the applicant's expertise;
4. the applicant's proprietary knowledge of a particular business process or methods of
operation must be unusual, not widespread across the organization, and not likely to
be available in the Canadian labour market.4
It must be noted that skill in implementing an off-the-shelf product would not by itself
be considered to be specialized knowledge, unless the product has suffered significant
modifications to the point that it has become quite unique. So, for example, if an individ-
ual is very skilled at customizing a commonly available computer program, that, by itself,
would not be sufficient to qualify the person as a Specialized Knowledge worker. How-
ever, if the product is combined with other products to achieve a customized and unique
solution that is proprietary to the employer, that may be considered as a qualifying degree
of expertise.
The new criteria will require Specialized Knowledge to be "unique and uncommon,"
held by only a small number or small percentage of employees of a given enterprise.
Under the new criteria, Specialized Knowledge workers must demonstrate that they are
key personnel, not simply highly skilled.5
In addition, Specialized Knowledge workers will have to demonstrate that:
* they are employed by and under the direct and continuous supervision of the host
company;
* they will not normally require training at the host company related to the area of
expertise; and
* the specialized knowledge will not be readily available within the Canadian labour
market, and cannot be readily transferred to another individual.
It must be noted that, where a treaty such as the NAFTA, or the Canada-Chile Free
Trade Agreement (CCFTA), or the Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement provides a differ-
ent definition of Specialized Knowledge, that definition will still apply.6
1. Introduction of Mandatory Wage Floor
A completely new element in the Specialized Knowledge category has been introduced.
The policy now requires that the employee claiming to possess Specialized Knowledge be
remunerated at a level commensurate with the position. In order to introduce some ob-
jectivity to the definition of a mandatory wage floor, the new criteria requires that the
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tion and region of work as listed in the Employment and Skills Development Canada
"Working in Canada" Website tool to determine prevailing Canadian Wage.7
While the authorities have been using wage levels as an indication of specialization for
some time, this is the first attempt to codify its use.
Non-cash payments such as hotel, transportation, and other benefits cannot be taken
into consideration when evaluating the prevailing wage. Only allowances compensated in
monetary form and paid directly to the employee can be included.8
The mandatory wage policy does not apply to Specialized Knowledge workers entering
Canada pursuant to NAFTA or to other international free trade agreements. Neverthe-
less, officers still must consider wages as an indicator of specialization in their overall
assessment. 9
These important changes restrict the use of the Intra-Company Transferee Specialized
Knowledge category and make it more difficult for employers to transfer technical person-
nel involved in Canadian projects. Changes to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program
are ongoing, and it is expected that further restrictions may be introduced in the future.
Given the evolving nature of the program, employers are encouraged to discuss specific
cases with legal counsel to ensure applications are made based on current and timely anal-
ysis of existing policies and programs.
B. UPDATE: ONE YEAR AFTER THE PASSING OF SPAIN'S LAW IN SUPPORT OF
FOREIGN-NATIONAL ENTREPRENEURS10
In the fall of 2013, Spain passed the Law in Support of Foreign-National Entrepreneurs
("Law")" to entice foreign nationals to invest in Spain in exchange for residency permis-
sion. According to the latest information from the Spanish Ministry of Economy ("Minis-
try"), the granting of visas associated with this Law's provisions recently increased in 2014.
From September 2013 to September 2014, the Ministry granted 3,266 visas, whereas in
the month of March 2014, when the Spanish Ministry of Economy released data on visas
issued through that month, only 818 visas had been granted.12
Of the visas issued through September 2014, 285 have been granted to foreign nationals
to invest in Spain for residency ("investment visa"). This includes those foreign investors
who opt for the purchase of real estate in Spain, the purchase of Spanish public debt, or
the launching of an entrepreneurial project-all of which are investment options for for-
eign nationals as presented in the Law in exchange for residency permission in Spain.13
Considering these 285 visas, 260 of them related to the purchase of property by foreign
investors; 17 related to the acquisition of capital by foreign investors; and eight related to
7. See Explore Careers by Wages, GOVT CAN., http://www.jobbank.gc.ca/wage-outlooksearch-
eng.do?reportOption=wage (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
8. Op. Bulletin 575, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Marina Bugallal Garrido (Mariscal Abogados & Asociados, Madrid, Spain) and Melanie Glover
(Alticor, Inc., Ada, Michigan, U.S.A).
11. Law to Support Entrepreneurs and Their Internationalization, (B.O.E. 2013, 14/2013) (Spain).
12. Carlos Molina, Los visados para atraer capitaly empleo extranjero se multiplican por cuatro (Visas to Attract
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foreign investors' entrepreneurial projects in Spain. According to the first estimations of
the Ministry, the investment in these projects is already rising to 497 million euros, and
the labor associated with these projects has resulted in 4,446 jobs.14
Unlike the investment associated with property and financial assets, entrepreneurial
projects are facing gradual implementation. According to the predictions for these busi-
nesses, an investment of 226 million euros and the creation of 2,410 jobs are predicted. If
the growth continues, entrepreneurial projects could become the most significant invest-
ment option under the Law, in addition to foreign investment in Spanish property, for
which the expense of 218 million euros is predicted. To apply for the investment visa and
obtain residency in Spain, a foreign national must carry out a "significant investment of
capital" in Spain."
A "significant investment of capital" is an initial investment:
* of an amount equal to or greater than two million euros in Spanish public debt secur-
ities, or of an amount equal to or greater than one million euros in shares, company
shares of Spanish businesses, or bank deposits in Spanish financial entities;
* of a value equal to or greater than 500,000 euros in the acquisition of property in
Spain;
or,
* an entrepreneurial project for development in Spain that is considered and recog-
nized as pertaining to "general interest."' 6
For the creation of an entrepreneurial project of general interest, the completion of at
least one of the following conditions will be valued: the creation of jobs; the performing of
an investment with socio-economic impact of relevance in the geographic environment in
which the activity is going to be developed; and support relevant to the scientific and/or
technologic innovation.
To demonstrate eligibility for the investment visa, a foreign national must confirm that
he or she:
i. is not present in Spain for any unlawful reason;
ii. is of legal age (at least 18 years of age);
iii. has no previous criminal record in Spain or in the countries in which he or she has
resided for the last five years;
iv. is not listed as objectionable in the Schengen countries;
V. has public or private medical insurance;
vi. has sufficient economic resources for himself or herself as well as for the members
of his or her family for the period of residence in Spain.' 7
The investment visa allows a foreign national to reside in Spain for at least one year. If
the foreign national is interested in living in Spain for more than one year, he or she may
apply for the Authorization of Residence for foreign investors. This Authorization lasts
two years, and it is renewable for two additional years. For this application, a foreign
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may apply for the Authorization within 90 days of the expiration date of the investment
visa in addition to proving that the foreign national has:
i. travelled to Spain at least once during the authorized period of residence to confirm
that the investment has maintained a value of equal or greater value than that origi-
nally invested, and
ii. complied with Spanish tax and Social Security obligations.'8
The investment visa does not allow foreign nationals to work, but the Authorization
does. If the foreign national proves a continued residence for five years in Spain, he or she
may apply for a residence of a longer duration.
Considering the visa options and current market conditions in Spain, investment in
Spain is attractive. Costs of housing have fallen by 40 percent, and according to the analy-
sis gathered by Bankinter, property investment in Spain has increased by 15.5 percent in
the first nine months of 2014 from the figure of 2013. In 2013, the cost of property
investments rose 112 percent, until it reached 3,800 million euros. Currently, the total
cost of the investments until September 2014 is 10,400 million euros. Of this figure,
4,900 million euros come from non-commercial assets; 1,500 million euros come from the
investment in offices; and 1,150 million euros come from commercial assets. Madrid
holds 55 percent of foreign investment for the year 2013, which is a total of 8,635 million
euros.
19
According to the Commercial Spanish Secretary of State, Jaime Garcfa-Legaz, Spain is
the "country of the euro zone that [has] attracted most direct foreign investment." He
added that the attraction of Spain came from the fact that it allows access to the European
market, the largest in the world ahead of either the U.S. or China. Five-hundred million
consumers form the country with rent per capita of about 25.810 euros (about US$32.00)
and a "powerful network of free commerce" with countries from all over the world.20
Investing in Spain is becoming profitable. Spain is an attractive European country in
which to invest in the property market, after the United Kingdom and Germany, and
Madrid is placed as the second most-preferred European city for investing in property
assets.2 1 Barcelona also finds itself among the ten most-preferred cities for foreign nation-
als to invest in property assets. 22
In summary, Europe seems to be attracting foreign investors once again. According to
the CBRE report,2 3 70% of the foreign investors choose Western Europe as the most
attractive global region to invest in property assets.
18. Law to Support Entrepreneurs and Their Internationalization, supra note 11.
19. See Investor Presentation, COMMUNIDAD DE MADRID (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.madrid.org/cs/Satel
lite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadernamel=Content-disposition&blobheader
name2=cadena&blobheadervaluel=filename%3D2015++FEBRUARY+27++Investor+Presenation.pdf&blob
headervalue2 =language% 3Des% 26site% 3DInversor&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere= 135
2867180536&ssbinary=true.
20. See Spanish Secretary of State "Now is the time to invest in Spain", ESADE (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www
.esade.edu/web/eng/about-esade/today/news/viewelement/277141/1/spanish-secretary-of-state-for-trade-
jaime-garcia-legaz:-now-is-the-time-to-invest-in-spain.
21. European Real Estate Investor Intentions 2014, CBRE http://www.cbrecapitalmarkets.com/EN/Knowl-
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C. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1. U.S. Supreme Court Considers Limits of Executive Power in Immigration Cases, but
Questions Remain over Naturalization24
In 2014, two U.S. Supreme Court immigration cases highlighted the tension between
executive supremacy and judicial oversight of U.S. immigration law decision-making.
The Supreme Court's decisions to weigh-in on the question of executive power over im-
migration power is important and timely in light of President Obama's November 20,
2014, announcement of broad immigration reform through executive action. 25
a. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio
First, in June 2014, the Supreme Court exhibited deference to the Executive Branch's
interpretation of immigration law in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,26 maintaining the Board
of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA).27
Specifically, the Supreme Court upheld the agency's interpretation that CSPA only safe-
guards the priority dates of a small subset of children who are listed as derivative benefi-
ciaries on their parents' family-based immigrant visa petitions, but who turn twenty-one
years old and "age out" while waiting for visas to become available.
Rosalina Cuellar de Osorio and her family, natives of El Salvador, waited seven years
for immigrant visas to permit them to come to the United States to join Rosalina's U.S.-
citizen mother. 28 When the family was informed that they were next in line for immi-
grant visas, they were told that the applicant's son, who had turned twenty-one while
waiting for a visa to become available and, therefore, was no longer a "child" under U.S.
immigration law and was not eligible for a visa, and thus could not immigrate with his
family to the United States.29 The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc decision, found that be-
cause the plain language of the CSPA unambiguously granted automatic conversion and
priority date retention to aged-out derivative beneficiaries in all family visa categories, and
the BIA's narrow interpretation of CSPA was not entitled to deference.30
In reviewing the case, Supreme Court focused on the following questions: (1) whether
CSPA's automatic conversion and priority date retention provision3 ' grants relief to all
noncitizens who qualify as "child" derivative beneficiaries when a visa petition is filed but
24. Jihan M. Hassan is an attorney with the Chicago office of Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen, & Loewy LLP,
a global corporate immigration law firm.
25. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
26. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
27. Matter ofXiuyi Wang, 25 1. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2009) (holding that automatic conversion and priority
date retention applied to some family-based visa categories but did not apply to individuals who "age out" of
eligibility as the derivative beneficiary of a fourth-preference family petition).
28. Kevin Johnson, Opinion Analys: Another Stop at the Chevron Station & Deference to the BIA, SCOTUS-
BLOC (Jun. 9, 2014, 3:26 PM), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-another-
stop-at-the-chevron-station-and-deference-to-the-bia/.
29. Id.
30. De Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012), reversed ly Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134
S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
31. Section 203(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that, "[i]f the age of an alien is deter-
mined . . . to be 21 years of age or older . . . , the alien's petinon shall automancally be converted to the
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age out of qualification by the time the visa becomes available to the primary beneficiary;
and (2) whether the BIA reasonably interpreted the statute. 32
Justice Kagan, announcing the judgment of the Court and delivering the plurality opin-
ion, reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, finding the statute ambiguous and that the BIA's
interpretation was reasonable and consistent with the statute's purpose.3 3 The plurality
held that most children who are listed as derivative beneficiaries34 on their parents' family-
based immigrant petitions, but who turn twenty-one years old and "age out" while waiting
for visas to become available, will not be able to retain their original priority dates and be
granted permanent residency along with their parents.35 Rather, they will need to start
the process anew by having their parents file a new immigrant petition once they become
lawful permanent residents. 36
The Supreme Court decision resolves a three-way circuit split over the statutory con-
struction of our nation's complex immigration laws.37 Additionally, it represents the latest
in a long line of Supreme Court cases giving broad discretion to the executive branch in
the interpretation and execution of U.S. immigration law.38 Commenting more broadly
appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original
petition."
32. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2191.
33. Id.
34. A "principal beneficiary" is an individual who has a qualifying relationship with a U.S. citizen or Lawful
Permanent Resident ('LPR') petitioner, who files a visa petition on behalf of the principal beneficiary. Deriv-
ative beneficiaries, defined as the spouse or minor child of the principal beneficiary, may also be named in the
principal beneficiary's visa petition, and are entitled to the same preference status, and the same priority date,
as the principal alien. U.S. Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 9 FAM § 42.31 n. 2.
35. Cuellar de Osorio, 695 F.3d. at 2191.
36. Id.
37. Compare Mayorkas, 695 F.3d at 1003 (holding that the plain language of the CSPA unambiguously
grants automatic conversion and priority date retention to aged-out derivative beneficiaries in all family visa
categories), and Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio,
134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014) (concluding that Congress plainly made automatic conversion and priority date reten-
tion available to derivative beneficiaries in all family-based preference categories), with Li v. Renaud, 654 F.3d
376 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding the CSPA's "automatic conversion" clause was unambiguous but coming to the
same conclusion as the BIA that an earlier family preference priority date could not apply to a later family
preference petition made by a different petitioner). The three circuit courts applied a two-part analysis set
forth in the influential Supreme Court decision, Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853 (1984). First, the reviewing court determines whether the statute's language is clear
on its face. If Congress has directly answered the question at issue, the analysis ends there. If, on the other
hand, the language or congressional intent is ambiguous, a reviewing court proceeds to the second step of
analysis and defers to the agency's interpretation, assuming it is reasonable. Charles Wheeler, Automatic
Conversion and Retention of Priority Date for Aged-Out Derivatives: Circuit Courts Only Add to the Confusion,
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., available at http://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/Auto-
matic% 20Conversion%2 Oand%20Retention%2Oof% 20Priority%2ODate%2 Ofor%2 OAged.pdf (last visited
June 27, 2014).
38. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210, 73 S. Ct. 625, 628 (1953)
("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control."), citing Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
13 S.Ct. 1016 (1893); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950); Harisi-
ades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512 (1952); see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2499 (2012) ("The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure
that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's foreign policy with respect to these and other
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on the proper scope of executive power over immigration, Justice Kagan stated that, "judi-
cial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration con-
text, where decisions about a complex statutory scheme often implicate foreign
relations."39
The Supreme Court decision in Cuellar de Osorio is disappointing for many "aged out"
derivative beneficiaries who had hoped to retain the priority dates of their earlier peti-
tions. These "aged out" young people sometimes wait decades for a visa to become availa-
ble only to lose their place in line upon turning twenty-one years old. However, there
may still be hope for a remedy to this restrictive rule in the future through legislative or
administrative action.
One possibility is that Congress could redraft the CSPA to clarify that all "aged out"
derivative beneficiaries are entitled to priority date retention. This was part of the com-
prehensive immigration reform bill passed by the Senate, which ultimately stalled in the
House of Representatives, making it unlikely that comprehensive immigration reform will
be passed soon or in its current form. 40 Alternatively, even in the absence of comprehen-
sive reform, Congress could amend the rule through piece-meal legislation.
A final option is that the current rule may be reversed through administrative action.
The plurality in De Osorio agreed that a narrow reading of INA § 203(h) was not com-
pelled by the statute, but rather that its meaning was ambiguous and, therefore, subject to
administrative deference.41 Therefore, the BIA may change course and reverse its posi-
tion in Matter of Wang.42 Moreover, since the BIA acts on behalf of the Attorney General,
the Attorney General may push back against Matter of Wang and adopt a broader interpre-
tation of INA § 203(h).43
b. Kerry v. Din
More recently, on October 2, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a second
immigration case involving the struggle between executive and judicial power, Kerry v.
Din.44 The Supreme Court's decision to hear the case represents an opportunity for the
Court, for the first time in more than forty years,45 to rethink the long-standing doctrine
realities. Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security play a major role in enforcing the country's
immigration laws.").
39. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2203, citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439
(1999) (internal quotes omitted); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904 (1988).
40. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., Careen Shannon, & Daniel Montalvo, Prospects for Immigration Reform in
2014, IMMIGR. LEGIs. HANDBOOK § 1:1 (April 2014).
41. See Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S.Ct. at 2206 (noting that "we hold only that §1 153(h)(3) permits-not that it
requires-the Board's decision to so distinguish among aged out beneficiaries").
42. Cyrus D. Mehta & David A. Isaacson, Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio: Does The Dark Cloud Have a
Silver Lining?, ILW (June 10, 2014), available at http://discuss.ilw.com/content.php?3214-Article-Scialabba-
V-Cuellar-De-Osorio-Does-The-Dark-Cloud-Have-a-Silver-Lining-By-Cyrus-D-Mehta-and-David-A-
Isaacson, citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (finding that
where a statute is ambiguous and entitled to Chevron deference, the agency may reconsider its interpretation
even after the courts have approved of it).
43. See id.
44. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014),_from Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82
U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1402).
45. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see also Gary Endelman & Cyrus D. Mehta, Kerry v.
Din: An Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Reconsider the Doctrine of Consular Nonreviewability, Insightful
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of consular non-reviewability, which prevents courts from reviewing decisions of U.S. De-
partment of State consular officers regarding immigration law.46 Specifically, the Court
will review whether a consular official's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's non-citizen
spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.
Ms. Din, a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition on behalf of her husband, Mr. Berashk, an
Afghan citizen. His visa was denied under INA section 212(a)(3)(B), the terrorism-related
inadmissibility grounds.47 The Consulate added, "it is not possible to provide a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the denial," citing INA section 212(b)(3), which indicates
that the requirement under INA section 212(b)(1) that an alien be notified of the reason
for a visa denial does not apply to any alien inadmissible under criminal activity or terror-
ist grounds. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the government had not offered a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial.48
The government appealed the Ninth Circuit decision to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the court "erred in ruling that Din has a liberty interest in her marriage, protected
under the Due Process Clause, that is implicated by denial of a visa to her alien spouse
abroad." 49 Ms. Din argues that she is entitled to challenge the refusal of a visa to her
husband and that to sustain the refusal, the government must identify a specific statutory
provision rendering him inadmissible and to allege what it believes he did that would
render him ineligible for a visa.5 0
Oral arguments in Kerry v. Din took place in February 2015 and a decision is expected
later this year. The pending Supreme Court case is important not only because it allows
the Court to weigh in on the controversial doctrine of consular non-reviewabilitys1 but
also because whatever the outcome, the case will almost certainly produce additional dis-
cussion regarding the scope of executive authority and judicial review over immigration
matters.
Immigration. Blog: Commentaries on Immigraton Policy, Cases & Trends (Oct. 6, 2014), available at http://
blog.cyrusmehta.com/2014/10/kerry-v-din-opportunity-for-supreme.html.
46. Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear & Loathing in Congress & the Courts: Immigration & Judicial Review, 78 Tex.
L. Rev. 1615, 1616-17 (2000).
47. In general, any individual who is a member of a "terrorist organization" or who has engaged or engages
in terrorism-related activity as defined by INA § 212(a)(3)(B) is "inadmissible" (not allowed to enter) the
United States and is ineligible for most immigration benefits. The definition of terrorism-related activity is
relatively broad and may apply to individuals and activities not commonly thought to be associated with
terrorism. Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG), U.S. CIS (Oct. 1, 2014), available at http://www
.uscis.gov/laws/terrorism-related-inadmiissability-grounds/terrorism-related-inadmiissibility-grounds-trig.
48. Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). The Ninth Circuit cited
the Supreme Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972), recognizing a limited exception to
the doctrine of consular non-reviewability in cases where the visa denial implicates the constitutional rights of
an American citizen. In such cases, courts exercise "a highly constrained review solely to determine whether
the consular official acted on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason."
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014) (No 13-1402).
50. Respondent Brief in Opposition, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014) (No. 13-1402); see also 91 No. 39
Interpreter Releases 1807, 1808.
51. See Brief for Professors & Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cardenas v. U.S., No. 13-
35957, 2014 WL 1878645 ("The doctrine of consular non-reviewability has never had a cogent justification.
To the contrary, Supreme Court case law allows for significant, if not robust, judicial review of consular
decisions. Such review-including at least review to ensure that the consular officer follows the governing
statutes and regulations, that there is some factual basis for findings made by the consular office, and that
fundamentally fair procedures are used-is essential to ensure that the laws passed by Congress are followed.").
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2. Executive Authority and Judicial Review of Naturalization Denial
Cuellar de Osorio and Din bring attention to a third, yet-unresolved legal question in-
volving the conflict between executive authority and judicial oversight-judicial review of
naturalization denials. The unsettled legal question concerns the availability and scope of
judicial review in cases where U.S.CIS denies an applicant's naturalization application and
then places the applicant in removal proceedings. Under INA § 310(c), if an application
for naturalization is denied by the agency, the applicant has the right to de novo review in
a district court "after a hearing before an immigration officer."52 However, under INA
§ 318, when removal proceedings are pending against an applicant for naturalization, the
agency is prohibited from considering her application. 3 Thus, where the agency denies
an applicant's request for naturalization and then initiates removal proceedings, the
agency has relied on INA § 318 to refuse to provide the applicant with an administrative
hearing. As no administrative hearing has taken place, the applicant has not "exhausted"
her administrative remedies, and many courts have held that the applicant no longer has a
statutory right to judicial review of the denial in a district court. In other words, the
agency effectively strips itself of jurisdiction over the person's naturalization application
and prevents the applicant from obtaining an administrative appeal. 4
The question of whether the commencement of removal proceedings strips district
courts of jurisdiction to review naturalization denials has recently become the subject of a
four-way circuit split. Specifically, nine circuit courts have considered the issue and have
come to four separate conclusions over whether and how the initiation of removal pro-
ceedings affects judicial jurisdiction to review naturalization applications. The Fourth,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits concluded that the right to judicial review granted by INA
§ 310(c) is limited by INA § 318 once removal proceedings begin." In contrast, the
Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished decision, held that INA § 318 "does not strip district
courts of jurisdiction over petitions regarding naturalization applications."6 However,
the court found that as soon as removal proceedings begin, the judicial proceeding be-
comes moot and the suit must be dismissed for lack of a case or controversy. 57 The Sec-
ond, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits held that INA § 318 does not deprive courts of jurisdiction,
but does prevent the courts from providing a remedy, so judgment must go for the agency
52. INA § 310(c) provides that "[a] person whose application for naturalization [ ... ] is denied, after a
hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such denial
before the United States district court [. . .] in accordance with [the Administrative Procedure Act.] Such
review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at
the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application."
53. INA § 318 provides in relevant part that "no application for naturalization shall be considered by the
Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of
arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act."
54. INA § 318.
55. Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 2010); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 339-40
(5th Cir. 2007); Huang v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 468 Fed.Appx 932, 935 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1460 (U.S. 2013).
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on the merits. 8 Most recently, the Third and Seventh Circuits reached a different con-
clusion. According to these courts, district courts not only retain jurisdiction over the
cases before them, but also retain the ability to provide a remedy-a declaratory judgment
of entitlement to citizenship.5 9
Despite the existence of a wide circuit split, the Supreme Court thus far has refused to
weigh in on the issue and resolve confusion in federal courts over the proper application of
INA § 310(c) and INA § 318.60 Supreme Court review of the issue would clear up confu-
sion between circuits as to the judiciary's role in naturalization. It also would provide an
opportunity for the Court to prevent the agency from using the statutes protective provi-
sions, INA §§ 310(c) and 318, to create "a mechanism for the government to deny immi-
grants their day in court." 6 1
58. Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2008); Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004);
Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004).
59. Klene v. Napolitano, 697 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2012); Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
678 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 2012).
60. See Hong Huang v. Napolitano, 133 S. Ct. 1460 (2013) (denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Huang v. Secretary U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 2012 WL 5884899
(U.S.), *10.
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